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Presocratlc Methodology 
Jerry Stanriard
If there is one thing that studente of the presocratics agree upon, 
it is that disagreement, ranging from textual emendations to wide sweeping 
differences of interpretation, characterizes modern research. Within the 
past thirty years, we have studied major contributions of such scholars as 
Chernisst Jaeger, Solmsen, Vlastos, von Fritz, and many others; each of whoa 
has added much that is new and valuable to our understanding of the presocratics 
Hather than attempt to assess these rival claims, I intend to draw a moral 
from this state of affairs. The absence of agreement, sometimes on basic 
matters, is a sign that further questions legitimately may be raised as to 
the meaning and intent of the presocratics.
The Anglo-American tradition of presocratlc scholarship goes back, in 
large measure, to Burnet’s now-claesical Early Greek Philosophy I do not 
mean by this, that Burnet's interpretation enjoys canonical status, for his 
views today are as often criticized as they are accepted. But the fact that 
scholars still feel it necessary to mention Burnet, if only to take issue with 
him, suggests that whatever his errors or defects may have been, they are 
nevertheless, still important. For, as historians of science are fond of 
remarking, errors are instructive if they stimulate further inquiry "A 
false theory may be as great an achievement as a true one," Karl Popper 
recently wrote and singled out as an instance of this, Thales' floating 
earth.
Time and again have I pondered a passage that enunciates one of Burnet’s 
main theses:
fly aim has been to show that a new thing came into the world with the 
early Ionian teachers - the thing we call science - and that they first 
pointed the way which Europe has followed ever since, so that ,,it is 
an adequate description of science to say that it is "thinking about 
the world in the Greek way," That is why science has never existed 
except among peoples who have come under the influence of Greece 
(Praef,^ p, V)
Most scholars today have reservations about accepting Burnet’s en­
thusiastic identification of presocratlc inquiry with science. Yet, as easy 
as it may he to find flaws in his overstatement of the case, X am not prepared 
to dismiss it with a non proluatur
I shall suggest, therefore, in the following exploratoire sketch, that 
Burnet's thesis may be defender} with the proviso that two conditions be satis­
fied, The first condition is that by "science" we understand "the formulation 
of an explanatory method," The second condition, one that has received con­
siderable attention in recent years, is that the sharp distinction 1« tween 
"science" and "philosophy" does injustice to presocratlc inquiry by insisting 
on a distinction which is anachronistic
2The concept of explanatory method need not be restricted to what has 
come to be the paradigm of explanatory method - modem science. There are 
several reasons for insisting upon this. The most obvious one is that philo 
sophy always has claimed that it is her role, as much as it is the role of 
science,to furnish explanations. Even granting that a distinction can be 
made in presocratic times between philosophy and science, it is evident that 
this distinction cannot be maintained on the grounds that their respective 
explanations apply to different sets of phenomena. And that brings up the 
second point, that the distinction between philosophy and science is not a 
presocratic distinction but one that modern scholars have imposed on the pre­
socratic fragments. Scholars may differ as to the debt owed by Plato and 
Aristotle to their predecessors, but all will agree that our distinction be­
tween philosophy and science, in so far as it applies to the presocratics, 
is as much a falsification of history as those falsifications for which Plato 
and Aristotle have been criticized.
Today, the phrase "explanatory method" is widely used and there appears 
to be some agreement that the essential ingredients are three:
I, The explicit formulation of specified techniques.
II. To be followed in a stipulated sequence,
III, For the solution of a circumscribed problem.
While there are, doubtless, many possible addenda to the above, it would not 
be too difficult to argue that the denial of aqy one of the three ingredients 
is tantamount to saying that the remaining two do not satisfy the conditions 
generally required of an explanatory method.
In order to explain a set of facts, whether or not by the conscious use 
of an explicitly-formulated method, certain preliminary stages are required. 
We would all agree, I think, that to speak of a method in the absence of 
specifying the content or subject matter is somehow inadequate. But that 
alone is not sufficient to describe an explanatory method. Professor Philip 
Wiener has recently written, in conjunction with specifying the nature of 
what is commonly called the history of ideas, "No discussion of problems and 
methods can mean much apart from the subject-matter, interests, and general 
basic assumptions of the investigators". (J.H.I. XXII, 538)
The application, if not the explicit formulation, of an explanatory 
method thus presupposes a prior stage which, however dimly it may be known 
to historians, supplied the content to which the method later applied. The 
almost simultaneous emergence of problems and difficulties will, moreover, 
contribute to the limits of the method's application and to further refine­
ments in the method itself.
For a variety of reasons it is not possible to describe the earliest 
stages of Greek thought, i.e., that period which preceded the application of 
an explanatory method. In order to do so» with some show of completenessf 
another Paidela or Glaube der Hellenen would be required. But it is possible 
to sketch some parts of the next stage, i.e., that period characterized by 
the application of an explanatory method. There is, to be certain, a third 
stage in which the method and its application are themselves the object of 
inquiry. But because of limitations of time, the third stage, generally 
characterized by its concern with methodology, will be ignored in the 
following discussion.
I shall attempt to localize some of the components of presocratic in­
quiry that have entered into the mainstream of later, more sophisticated 
types of explanation. Despite the fact that the presocratics rarely 3poke 
of method per se, there are scattered indications that there was, in* fact,, 
an hodos in the sort of inquiry then prevailing and the belief that, were 
this hodos to be laid out in advance, and then followed, an entrance would 
be made on yet uncharted territory. Heraclitus" recommendation that to know 
many things one must be a lover of wisdom (B 35) announces that to know those 
many things, certain techniques must be adopted. Diogenes of Apollonia states, 
in the most general terms, one requirement, but that is sufficient to indicate 
by its very generality, that method was indispensable,, "In starting any 
thesis,...one should put forward as one's point of departure something in­
controvertible..." (B 1).
We can abstract from presocratic explanations and reconstruct the com­
ponents which such explanations presupposed. 'Whether the presocratics had 
a name to describe such a component as, say, inference,is of less consequence 
than the fact that they made use of inferential reasoning in a wide variety 
of explanatory contexts. We are, accordingly, entitled to speak of inference 
as a component of presocratic explanatory method.
Having now characterized explanatory method, let us use it a3 a guide 
by which the components of such a method may be more precisely delineated.
I do not claim that the following list exhausts all of the components of an 
explanation - presocratic or otherwise. On the other hand, each of the 
following can, I think, be defended as essential to those tyoes of explanation 
which, as Burnet would say, have Ionian antecedents.
I. Inference
It is not my intention in discussing this or succeeding points, to an­
numerate all of the instances which could serve as evidence of the point in 
question. Since the presocratic fragments are readily accessible, it seems 
more important to discuss a few fragments representative of each of the 
following components of explanatory method.
Inference or inferential reasoning is an essential ingredient in all 
forms of explanation. Obviously, inference takes many forms and at various 
points abuts upon other equally-essential components of an explanation, for 
example, evidence, causal connection, prediction, etc. Any explanation, more­
over, is characterized by the fact that one set of data becomes more intelligible 
when it is brought into relation with another set of data. The connection 
between these two sets varies considerably; in some cases it is immediately 
obviouso while in other cases, the connection may demand further inquiry. A 
mixed type is that known as analogy. The explicans must be immediately ob­
vious, otherwise the explicandum can not be said to have been explained.
When Musaeus sought to explain the cycle of birth and death, he chose to 
illustrate it by drawing an analogy between it and the seasonal cycle of 
vegetation (B 5)* Empedocles, too, made use of common knowledge when he 
likened the sea to the sweat of the earth (B 55)=-
It was probably very early in man's intellectual career that the defects
4of analogical reasoning became apparent. Wien Anaximander likened the earth 
to a stone pillar (B 5)o be was calling attention to the limitations of analogy 
as a form of explanation» True as it may be that the earth's fixed position 
in a geocentric universe may be better understood by arguing that it, like a 
stone pillar, has a fixed and rigid position, it cannot be denied that in many 
other respects there is little similarity. 'Wien analogies generate more dif­
ficulties than they explain, another pattern of inferential reasoning is re­
quired if explanation is to continue.
A more sophisticated form of inferential reasoning is characterized by 
the schema, "If P then Q." Interest in this form of reasoning lies not only 
in its increased explanatory powers, but also in the assumption in back of it. 
The derivation of one statement from another rests on the assumption that the 
grammatical connection between statements represents a causal connection be­
tween events in the physical world. Although this assumption was not made ex­
plicit in prcsocratio times, the explanatory force of such an inference was 
recognized. On the authority of Aristotle, Thales is said to have believed 
that the soul was a moving force. Aristotle repeats, or at least paraphrases, 
the main point of Thales1 arguments, "...the lodestone possesses soul because 
it moves iron” (A 22). Both the inferential form of this argument and its 
explanatory function are preserved when it is recast into the form, "If the 
lodestone moves iron, then the lodestone possesses a soul." It should be ob­
served that the explanatory role of this inference depends upon acceptance of 
a causal connection between the stone’s possession of a soul and its ability 
to attract pieces of iron. For otherwise, the stone's property is left un­
explained and no progress has been made, that is, the juxtaposition of the 
two statements is a mere irrelevancy.,
It is not always easy to catch the force of ancient arguments because 
what has been preserved is not labelled as "premise" or as "conclusion*.
(cf. Alcmaeon B 2; Diog. Apoll. B 8). In other cases, however, the inferential 
force of the argument is self-contained as in a contrary-to-f act conditional; 
for example, Xenophanes (B 15) or Heraclitus, "If there were no sun, the 
other stars notwithstanding, it would be night" (B 99)· Whatever was Hera­
clitus' evidence, other references to eclipses (¿raped. 3 42) and to the 
reflected light of the sun (Parm. B 14, Emped. B 43-45, Anaxag. B 18), make 
it clear that a causal relation was recognized between certain types of astro­
nomical phenomena. How much of this was due to observation and how much was 
due to speculation is a vexed question. But, for our purposes, it is im­
portant to recognise that in inferential reasoning the two coalesce. Hie 
solution as to whether Thales predicted an eclipse (A 1 s. 23) is hampered 
by our inability to separate out the observational data from the inferences, 
or speculations, founded on them.
II. Evidenoe
The foregoing examples bring out a further point concerning the de­
velopment of an explanatory method. By accepting the assumption which, as 
we have seen, permits a passage from the connection between statements to 
a connection 1« tween events in the physical world, the gap is widened be­
tween two types of evidence. That is, an explanation may employ as evidence
f
$further grammatical or logical connections uncovered, so to speak, by analysis. 
One such species of this is commonly known as deductive reasoning Or, the 
evidence may be based on sensory reports « Kx'-unples of evidence in this second 
sense are empirical evidence and, at a slight further remove, prediction,.
Two examples will make clear the important differences between these two types 
of evidence, both of which are integral to an explanatory method,
'■.Τιβη Parmenides argued that Being was One and that it was impossible 
to speak of Non-Being, he was employing a type of argument that contained 
an example in miniature of how evidence is used in a philosophic explanation 
Flrsl he ruled out sensory evidence as relevant to deciding the merits of a 
certain type of statement. Then he explored what consequences would follow 
if his hypothesis that 3eing is One were (a) True or (b) False, If his 
hypothesis were true, he could consistently explaii further phenomena, or 
further properties of Being, If, on the other hano, it were false, then 
the truth-value of other statements muet be revised, But these, commonly 
accepted as false, could not, without serious misgixings, be supposed to be 
true. From this it followed, claimed Parmenides, th.t hie initial supposition 
must be true.
For evidence in the second sense, we shall turn \o Empedocles. While 
it cannot seriously be maintained that he was an evolutionist, still less a 
Darwinist, the very fancifulness of this fin de siècle comparison, draws at­
tention to an important component of explanatory method. The enormous dif­
ference between Empedocles’ and Darwin’s method must not ebscure one point 
of resemblance. Although rather trivial by modem standar; s, this one point 
is of the utmost historical importance. The resemblance coioems their use 
of evidence and the consequences which each drew from that evidence. It is 
idle to pretend that Empedocles' evidence was of the same nature as Darwin’s 
or that each obtained his evidence in the same manner. Nevertheless, the 
fact remains that in each case their respective theories and ge.s rali nations 
, were supported by evidence.
In several cases, Empedocles cites the evidence that supports hie 
claims, for example, his belief that, in some sense, hair, leaves, athers, 
and scales were comparable (B 82). Whether or not this permits the h.storian 
of biology to attribute to Empedocles a knowledge of homologous structve, 
the mere possibility of such an attribution depends on the fact that Em­
pedocles has cited precisely the evidence that would justify the attribut, on. 
His famous clepsydra experiment (B 100), like that of Anaxagoras’ (A 69).> 
provides another example. In these cases, leaving aside the vexed question ? 
experimentation, we learn something further of ancient explanatory method.
For in these cases, not only i/$ their evidence cited, thus permitting a 
duplication, but the theories based on that evidence are communicated as well.
Today, as well as yesterday, the distinction between description and 
explanation is sometimes blurred. Despite the excellent admonition of Julius 
Sachs, "Was man nicht gezeichnet hat, hat man nicht geseken", in fields as 
widely separated as astrophysics or genetics, it is difficult to avoid 
imposing explanatory or interpretative categories when describing a complex 
process. In presocratic times it was not easy to avoid blurring the dis-
/
6tinction between description and explanation (e„g., Parra. B 110 Enped. B 35), 
nor is it easy for us to determine what theories were based on relatively- 
pure descriptive evidence (e.g.* Diog. Apoll. B 6, Democr. B 22). It is, 
therefore, to miss the point of, say, fcinpedocles* clepsydra experiment if it 
be said that the experiment was inconclusive or that experimental controls 
were wanting. It is no more just to lable as false Xenophanes* assertion 
that "M all have our origin from earth and water" (B 33)· The very fact that 
the truth-claim of an assertion, offered as an explanation, depends on evi­
dence, is a noteworthy step forward. No less important is the fact that this 
evidence must be selected out of a much larger collection of possible data.
How the presocratics faced this issue is our next point.
III. Classification
Once evidence becomes important in the support 0Γ  substantiation of an 
explanation, a methodological problem arises. Assuming that much of the evi­
dence available to the presocratics was of the sort that could be obtained 
with a bare minimum of specialized equipment or instrumentation, there re­
mains the problem of using it effectively. What, for example, was Xenophanes 
to do with the mass of fossilized remains he observed on Paros and elsewhere 
(A 33)? Classification first arose in the attempt to catalogue such ac­
cumulated evidence. By "classification”, one must not think of the elaborate 
structures current in the heyday of the descriptive sciences and illustrated 
by Linnaeus' binomial classification. Rather, one must look to the earliest 
forms of classification - dividing, and collecting, or as Plato later will 
tern them diaire sis and s.vnagSgé. These techniques, as simple as they may 
be, contain the essentials of classification and can thus claim a place in 
the development of explanatory method. The recognition of a criterion, whether 
it is made explicit or not, by which one divides particulars into several 
groups or collects discrete particulars into a group, is the minimal requirement 
for a classification. An elementary example, in the sense that the criteria 
are not explicit, and that no clear distinction between collecting and dividing 
is discernible, is the fragment of Democritus' almanac-like classification 
of weather-signs (B 14).
In antiquity, the search for a criterion often took the form of a 
search for some factor common to a group of particulars which for·some im­
plicit reason, were roughly lumped together, for example, Heraclitus* cata­
logue of "Night-ramblers, magicians, Bacchants, Maenads, Mystics" (B 14).
It makes no difference whether this common-factor was imposed in an arbi­
trary fashion, for as logicians have taught us, any property can serve to 
define a set. Again, Heraclitus provides an example ty his assertion that 
"Reason is common to all" (B 113), that is, with respect to the possession 
of reason, there is a property common to members of a certain set and that 
this property serves to distinguish that set from other sets not so charac­
terized.
Thus, the search was on in presocratic writers to find the common fac­
tor which by its presence or absence was a sufficient condition to collect 
or divide particulars, with respect to that criterion, into their respective 
classes. Instances of the attempt to classify and thus explain in a unified 
fashion the set so defined occur in the early stages of presocratic meteor­
ology. The common factor sought after may take a variety of forms, but it
?will suffice to mention one representative type of classification.
Anaximines' primal element, air, unlike Anaximanders* apeiron was 
determinate. Of this material, it was said that "it differs in different 
tilings according to its rarity or density. In its rare fora it giveè rise 
to fire and in its dense form it gives rise to wind from which come clouds 
and when more dense water; in turn, comes earth, then stones, and from them 
everything else" (A 5)« The importance of this passage is twofold. It is a 
classification of meteorological phenomena in terms of the criteria "rare" 
and "dense"» But more than that, in so classifying a diverse group of 
meteorological phenomena, Anaximines has also supplied an explanation of 
their origin and nature. In a similar fashion modem phylogenetic taxonomies 
not only classify, but in the process of classifying also explain the ancestry 
of orders and families within the larger taxonomical groupings.
IV. Hypothesis
The fragment of Anaximines, just discussed, will serve to illustrate 
another step in the development of explanatory method. "Rare" and "dense" 
have been rejected as criteria for classifying and explaining meteorological 
phenomena, but it does not follow that such an attempt at classification was 
lacking in explanatory power. On the basis of these criteria, hitherto un­
related meteorological phenomena were unified and given a consistent ex­
planation. Although the explanation turned out to be factually false, j#' 
the fact remains that it was internally consistent because of the rigor in 
which these, and no other criteria, were applied in order to explain the data 
in question. The adoption of a criterion on the strength that it will unify 
and explain, plus the fact that the resulting explanation will be, at least 
with respect to that criterion, internally consistent, may be termed a 
hypothesis. At the moment of its adoption a hypothesis is neither true nor 
false. It is, rather, a well-phrased question or a poorly-phrased question. 
"The method of approach to any scientific problem," Julian Huxley once wrote, 
"is itself largely dictated by the type of answer you want to obtain, it is, 
in fact, a kind of question." It may turn out that the hypothesis is con­
firmed, in which case it is in line for a promotion to a theory or even a 
law, or it is rejected. In either case, it directs attention to one problem 
or a certain class of data, for which better answers are required than those 
hitherto available.
There are numerous occurrences in presocratic writings of what might 
be called hypotheses, that is, questions which, along with the answers thereto,- 
served to explain a set of facts. Like hypotheses in the modern sense, Al­
cmaeon' s isonomia, Heraclitus* logos, or even Thales* floating earth, served 
their purpose by unifying data not otherwise or not hithertofore amenable 
to inquiry, and hence explaining them. Although fragmentary evidence prevents 
us from judging, in systematic terms, presocratic writings, there is some 
evidence that Kmpedocles and Anaxagoras attempted to explain, in a systematic 
manner, a wide range of data. It would appear that their efforts at a system 
depended upon the explanatory usefulness of their hypotheses. Because 
Anaxagoras' noua and Ebipedocles' philia kai neikoe have been superseded as 
explanatory categories, their role as hypotheses is seen more clearly. By 
its very nature, an hypothesis is provisional and its replacement by a more 
adequate or fertile suggestion reinforces the claim that a hypothesis serves 
its purpose best when it initiates further inquiry.
δV. Generalisation
As indicated previously, one way by which a hypothesis is tested in 
preparation for its eventual acceptance or rejection» is the degree t>y which 
it can be generalized» If it will explain, when applied to data not speci­
fically included in its initial formulation, it may be termed a generalization 
Thus, whatever we may think about Thales’ statement that “all things are full 
of Gods" (A 22)5 it is clearly a generalization and, perhaps for that reason, 
it was the mors easily found to be lacking in explanatory power. Generali­
zations are, however, not restricted to the testing of hypotheses for* as 
Beveridge has recently noted, "Generalizations can never be proved £butj they 
can be tested,»»" Once a hypothesis has been accepted, generalization (sup­
plies the means of extending its range of application to the point that it 
becomes, in its own right, an essential component of explanatory method/. 
Presumably Heraclitus’ statement that "¿very creature is driven to pasture 
with a blow" (B 11), is a generalization which cither supports his system 
as a premise or is derivable as a conclusion from other statements. This 
relation of generalization to the other portions of a system comes out more 
clearly in Empedocles' observation, "Thus all (sc, creatures) have a share 
of breathing and smell" (B 102)» The force of the particles (node men oun) 
suggests that this statement was a conclusion Empedocles derived from his 
observations on the physiology of respiration, fragments of which still re­
main (3 100-101)»
Much has been written about the origin of Natural Law and Laws of 
Nature though it is difficult to determine when the idea first became crys­
tallized in a form which we would recognize today. While it is true that the 
earliest of the presocratics did not use the term nomos tes phvseo3 » it seams 
probable that they viewed the succession of events and natural cycles in law­
like terms. For example,, the so -called "Attraction of Likes,1' despite its 
limited application, is capable of being stated in law-like* terms which ap­
ply to the whole of nature (ef. Eraped. B 1C9)» just as did the earlier "Law 
of Opposites" (e»g,„ Anaximand» A l6) and later forms of mechanical regularity 
(e»g», Leucip» B 2), This law-like behavior of natural phenomena was quickly 
seized upon as part of the explanation of those phenomena» One has only to 
think of the famous first fragment of Anaximander to note the explanatory 
force of a generalization. Whether Anaximander generalized from the primitive 
lex talionis or whether the pregnant phrase kata to chreôn was originally 
formulated with reference to cosmological explanation is a matter of con­
jecture» None the less, any interpretation of Anaximander's role in philo­
sophy and/or science must make room for the generalized, and at the sane 
time, the explanatory force of his claim that natural phenomena "give jus­
tice and make reparation to one another for their injustice, according to the 
arrangement of Time" (B 1)» We do not know what Anaximander would have ac­
cepted as a legitimate deduction, but that he intended his statement to be 
generalized seems clear from the last clause concerning the? universality of 
time.. For time is one of the metra by vjhich the dimensionis of a generali­
zation are determined (e»g«, Diog. Apoll. B 3)»
VI. Guarantee
The ultimate test of any method is its effectiveness- But, as we all 
know, this is an uncertain guarantee, for success in one or a few instances 
does not necessarily entail success in all cases. Perhaps one of the most
9striking differences between ancient and modern explanatory methods lies 
at precisely this point. When we have reason to believe that an explanatory 
method will always prove to be reliable, we are assuming that the correct 
application of the method, with all that it entails in the way of external 
conditions, parameters, etc., is in itself its own guarantee. That is, 
the guarantee, such as it is, is internal to the method. It is for this 
reason that some scientists speak of their method as "self-correeting”. Thus, 
Louis Pasteur defended "this marvelous experimental method" on the grounds,
"not that it is sufficient for every purpose, but that it rarely leads astray, 
and then only those who do not use it well."
It is otherwise with those methods which have been rejected on the 
grounds that their results are not always reliable and that no margin of 
error or limits of application are included in their formulation. A major 
reason why these methods have been rejected lies in the nature of their 
guarantee of reliability. Generally, a method is found to be objectionable, 
or at least highly suspect, when the guarantee of its reliability Í3 external 
to it. As Carl Becker put it, "No serious scholar would now postulate the 
existence and goodness of God as a point of departure for explaining the 
quantum theory or the French Revolution." An extra-methodological guarantee 
is a not uncommon device in presocratic writings. One thinks of Empedocles* 
invocation to the gods as providing him with a guarantee (B 3 init.) or of 
Heraclitus' emphatic distinction between human fallibility and divine truth 
(B 73). In both cases, the feeling of certainty that permeates their as­
sertions depends as much on a prior belief in the nature of the guarantee or 
guarantor as in the testable consequences of the method itself. When Philo­
laus stated that "there are certain thoughts which are stronger than our­
selves" (B 16), this certainty, like that felt by Parmenides (B 2 init,) 
is no different psychologically from that felt by Archytas in arriving at 
a mathematical proof (B k); the difference lies in the location of the guarantee.
The fact that ancient and modern explanatory methods differ on the 
location of their respective guarantees, does not mean that the ancient 
demand for an extra-methodological guarantee is historically unimportant.
For if one compares the type of explanation proceeding from a mythopoetic 
cosmogony, as Hesiod's Theogony. with a presocratic cosmological explanation, 
it will be observed that one of the fundamental differences Í3 the latter9s 
concern that there be a guarantee. It matters not, at this point, whether 
the guarantee is internal or external to the method. For the belief that 
the purpose of a method is to provide a consistent explanation X3 in sharp 
contrast to the inconsistencies permitted in mythological explanations. 
Inconsistencies, to say nothing of factual errors and conceptual extrava­
ganzas as the Orphic World Egg, were apparently not felt to be defects in 
mythologies I «cause there was no standard or logos by which they might be 
judged, as there would have been had a guarantee been included.
The frequent occurrence of the word "Truth" in presocratic writings 
testifies to the care they took lest they be confused with their mytho­
logizing predecessors. Even the equally-frequent denial that truth can be 
attained points in the same direction for, in no case in presocratic litera­
ture, does the denial of the attainability of truth lead to a suspension of 
the method which oermits that assertion. Neither Xenophanes (B 31*) nor 
Democritus (B 8 and 10) ha*j any doubts about the compatibility of the use-
10# »· ·#
fulness and reliability of his method with the claim that truth cannot be 
attainedo
Although truth is only one form of a guarantee, it cannot be doubted 
that historically» any method which claimed to lead to, or was supported by„ 
truth had mi initial advantage over a method which made no such claims (cf- 
Democr, B II7)» For, as Epicharmus said» "No sooner are the words spoken 
than the fault appears" (B 14·)* Probabilisnu and the relativism described 
by Xenophanes (B 16) and Heraclitus (B 82), are» like truth, forms of a 
guarantee-, While it is probably hyperbolic to see in Protagoras1 homo mensura 
argument the direct ancestor to the modern disenchantment of what Dewey 
called "The Quest for Certainty," there are some grounds for believing that 
a healthy scepticism lies in back of the modest claim that some method is 
better than no method-, For, it is no method when it is claimed before that 
method is tried» that all its results are vouchsafed by revelation or fiat.
I am aware that in characterizing explanatory method as I have, certain 
steps were omitted which have a strong claim to being essential in any such 
method» Today, logical rigor, semantic precision, and an historical review 
of the subject are as much parts of our working vocabulary as stoicheion or 
rioxa were to the presocratios» With some effort, passages could be cited to 
indicate that the presocratics were not totally ignorant of procodures such 
as these» But» on the whole, the adoption of these procedures was far from 
being a widespread practice» Other components of explanatory method could» 
perhaps» be extracted from presocratic writings; for example, prediction» 
controlled experiments, experimental confirmation, quantitative measûrement» 
etc» But, even in their simplest forms» these later procedures require 
apparatus or equipment of the sort that was not readily obtainable in anti­
quity» Therefore, I have concentrated ny remarks on the conceptual apparatus 
rather than on the technological apparatus in the belief that there were no 
physical barriers to prevent their widespread adoption in a variety of ex·.- 
planatory contexts» Why ancient science failed and ancient philosophy pros» 
pered is a topic I leave for another occasion. But» in closing, I think that 
the answer is not to be found by projecting our compartmentalization of dis» 
ciplines back to the presocratics. That they tried to explain is» I trust0 
admitted on all hands» To describe how they did it, and not how far they 
succeeded, las been my aim in this paper»
